The development history of Russia's sulphur industry can be traced back to the Soviet era. As early as 1939, Russia began producing contact process sulphuric acid, marking the start of its modern sulphur chemical industry. After decades of development, Russia has established a complete sulphur production system, forming an integrated industry chain from raw material extraction to deep processing.
As the world's second-largest sulphur producer, Russia was once crucial in global sulphur trade. Its sulphur mainly served as a by-product of oil and gas processing, with annual production consistently around 5.6 million mt, most of which was used for exports. However, between 2022-2025, it experienced a yearly deepening from policy restrictions, production shrinkage to near-supply chain disruption, transforming Russia from a major net exporter with annual exports reaching 3.9 million mt (in 2019) into a net importer.
In terms of sulphur sources, 90% comes from gas fields, 6% from sulphide ores, and 4% from native sulphur. The main sources of sulphur include natural gas associated gas recovery, petroleum refining by-products, and non-ferrous metal smelting. Among these, natural gas associated gas recovery is the most important source, especially in large gas fields such as Astrakhan and Orenburg.
Since the outbreak of conflict in February 2022, Russia's refining system, railway transportation network, and international trade routes have been continuously hit, collectively leading to a sharp decline in its sulphur production and a fundamental reversal of its export pattern.
In 2022, despite the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, sulphur production was not significantly affected, but logistics began to be obstructed.
Refineries and transportation: In the early stages of the conflict, refineries were not the primary targets, but Black Sea maritime logistics were substantially blocked, forcing more reliance on rail transport. As sanctions intensified and production facilities came under threat, Russia began to realize the need to establish certain strategic reserves to ensure food and production security. In August 2022, the Russian Federation government imposed temporary export quotas on certain sulphur products.
Sanctions impact: A dense wave of Western sanctions was introduced, with over 92% of sanctions against Russia implemented after February 2022, aimed at comprehensively restricting the Russian economy.
In 2023, the impact of the conflict expanded, affecting both production and transportation. Due to Western sanctions, Russia's export destinations shifted.
Refineries and transportation: Ukraine started using drones to attack energy facilities deep within Russia. The railway system, taking on more transportation tasks and affected by early sanctions, began to come under pressure, with freight volumes declining. For the first time, there was a significant downward trend in Russian railway freight volume.
Sanctions impact: The EU's ban on Russian oil products took effect, directly impacting the revenue and operations of Russia's refining industry. Sanctions continued to escalate, with the EU imposing an embargo and price cap on Russian petroleum products. Russia shifted towards Asian markets, increasing exports to China, India, Southeast Asia, and other Asian countries. Customs data showed that, affected by geopolitical factors and fluctuations in international logistics costs, Russia's sulfur exports to China grew significantly after 2022, reaching 1.5 million mt in 2023.
In 2024, the conflict significantly impacted production, and Russia's trade situation deteriorated.
Refineries and Transportation: Attacks became a systemic issue. According to statistics, about 30 large refineries were attacked, resulting in the loss of approximately 10% (25 million to 30 million mt/year) of refining capacity. Railway freight volume decreased by 7.1% YoY, with key materials such as construction materials and metals experiencing declines exceeding 15%.
Impact of Sanctions: The dual effects of sanctions and attacks began to show in export data, with Russia's total fuel exports decreasing by 9.1% YoY. After more than two years of sanctions, Russian sulfur exports faced increasing obstacles, including difficulties in payment settlements, shortages of transport vessels, and insurance refusals.
2025: Sulfur production decreased substantially, and Russia transitioned from a net exporter to a net importer.
Refineries and Transportation: Attack intensity peaked. In H1, refineries in Ryazan and other locations were repeatedly attacked; by the end of September, up to 38% of primary processing capacity (approximately 338,000 mt/day) was idled, 70% of which was caused by drone attacks. The railway system continued to experience capacity shrinkage due to component shortages caused by sanctions and labor conscription.
Impact of Sanctions: EU sanctions in 2025 once involved Russia's key export port, Ust-Luga. Although exemptions were later granted for fertilizer raw materials like sulfur, this increased trade uncertainty and compliance costs. By June 2025, the total number of sanctions against Russia exceeded 30,000.
In October 2025, Russia made its first import, purchasing 35,000 mt of sulfur from abroad at a price of $390 per mt. This marked Russia's first large-scale sulfur import in many years, signaling the end of its era of sulfur self-sufficiency. It is estimated that Russia will need to import an additional approximately 1 million mt of sulfur annually to cover the domestic supply gap.
In summary, Russia has transitioned from a sulfur supplier to a sulfur demander in global trade, leading to a contraction in the supply side of international sulfur trade. Due to the ongoing conflict and equipment repairs, this is expected to have a long-term impact on sulfur supply for at least three years.
